Closing Argument: Addressing Damages in Aviation Wrongful Death Cases by Murphy, Kevin W.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 73 | Issue 2 Article 6
2008
Closing Argument: Addressing Damages in
Aviation Wrongful Death Cases
Kevin W. Murphy
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kevin W. Murphy, Closing Argument: Addressing Damages in Aviation Wrongful Death Cases, 73 J. Air L. & Com. 463 (2008)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol73/iss2/6
CLOSING ARGUMENT: ADDRESSING DAMAGES IN
AVIATION WRONGFUL DEATH CASES
KEVIN W. MURPHY*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Would one dollar per hour for that kind of suffering be too
high?"
"Isn't this man's life worth more than his salary?"
"How would you feel if you were in the same situation as my
client?"
"At some point we need to take responsibility for our own actions
instead of looking to someone else to compensate us for our
error.
H OW DO YOU ARGUE damages in an aviation wrongful
Ideath case? What can you argue? What shouldn't you ar-
gue? If you are the defense attorney, should you even argue
damages? In every aviation accident case, particularly in a cata-
strophic injury or wrongful death case, plaintiff and defense
counsel must give considerable thought to the development of
their respective damages strategies. A trial typically seeks a reso-
lution of two competing interests. The first is the plaintiffs in-
terest in finding the defense liable to the greatest extent
possible by law. The second interest is the defense's interest in
exonerating the client or, at the very least, minimizing its expo-
sure. To meet these goals, some attorneys have pushed the limit
when arguing damages in closing, and some, in the eyes of the
appellate courts, have crossed the line. This paper discusses
those limits and other issues relevant to closing argument in the
aviation wrongful death context.
* Kevin W. Murphy is Vice President of Allianz Aviation Managers, LLC in
Chicago. Formerly, he was a partner at the Chicago-based firm of Adler, Murphy
& McQuillen, which has tried numerous aviation cases to verdict. The author
wishes to thank John W. Adler, Michael G. McQuillen, and Christine Niemczyk
for their excellent assistance with, and contributions to, this article.
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II. WHAT IS (AND IS NOT) ACCEPTABLE
CONTENT FOR CLOSING
The scope of closing argument in most jurisdictions is within
"the sound discretion of the trial court."' Counsel is allowed
broad latitude in drawing reasonable inferences and conclu-
sions from the evidence. Improper comments generally do not
constitute reversible error unless the other party has been sub-
stantially prejudiced so as to be denied a fair trial.2 The follow-
ing discussion illustrates some of those comments in closing
argument that perhaps come dangerously close to the line, and
those which certainly result in reversal on appeal.
A. PER DIEM COMPENSATION ARGUMENTS
Aviation wrongful death cases, by their very nature, typically
involve gruesome manners of death, either by thermal injuries,
severe trauma, or both. Moreover, in many cases there may be
some evidence that the pilot and passengers were aware of the
problem with the aircraft during the flight and before impact.
This, of course, raises pain and suffering issues, from pre-impact
to post-impact pain and suffering.
One often considered argument for pain and suffering dam-
ages as the per diem argument. A per diem argument, also known
as a formula argument, "is made when the plaintiff requests a
lump sum amount for future pain and suffering damages."3
This lump sum is then" divided by the number of time units ex-
pected in a plaintiffs life to equal a price of pain per unit.4
Both plaintiff and defense counsel should consider the benefits
and the risks of arguing that the amount plaintiff is seeking is
equivalent to a certain amount of money each day.
A leading case analyzing whether the formula technique
should be allowed in closing arguments is Botta v. Brunner.5 In
Botta, the New Jersey Supreme Court prohibited the use of the
formula technique, finding that the arguments invaded the
province of the jury, were speculative, and were not supported
by evidence.6 The Botta court forbade the mention or request of
Golian v. Wollschlager, 893 So. 2d 666, 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
2 Tanner v. Beck, 907 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
3 Craig Lee Montz, Why Lawyers Continue to Cross the Line in Closing Argument: An
Examination of Federal and State Cases, 28 Oi-io N.U. L. REx,. 67, 123 (2001) (quot-
ing Wilson v. Williams, 933 P.2d 757, 758-59 (Kan. 1997)).
4 Id.
5 138 A.2d 713 (NJ. 1958).
6 Id. at 723-25.
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any amount of future pain and suffering damages by the plain-
tiffs attorney, condemning his argument to the jury asking,
"[w] ould fifty cents an hour for that kind of suffering be too
high?"7
The Supreme Court of Illinois has held that a per diem argu-
ment discourages "reasonable and practical consideration [s]"
on the part of the jury.'
Jurors are as familiar with pain and suffering and with money
as are counsel.... [A]n impartial jury which has been properly
informed by the evidence and the court's instructions will, by the
exercise of its conscience and sound judgment, be better able to
determine reasonable compensation than it would if it were sub-
jected to expressions of counsels' partisan conscience and judg-
ment on the matter. 9
On the other hand, Florida courts seem to be amenable to
the per diem approach. In Allred v. Chittenden Pool Supply, Inc.,"
the Florida Supreme Court stated, "[a]rgument of a plaintiffs
counsel to the jury regarding various elements of damages, espe-
cially where pain and suffering are involved, based on a mathe-
matical formula of calculable value or on a per diem basis may
be helpful to the jury in its final deliberations."'" Such a ruling
is echoed in Payne v. Alvarez,12 where an appellate court in Flor-
ida permitted the plaintiff to use an argument suggesting to the
jury an amount which should be allowed for pain and suffering
on a per diem basis. 3
Obviously, the law on pain and suffering depends on jurisdic-
tion. As a result, it is important for counsel to research the law
of the jurisdiction and any personal preferences of the judge to
determine whether a per diem argument is permitted and
whether such an argument would be wise in that court, before
that judge, and presented to those jurors.
7 Id. at 718.
s Caley v. Manicke, 182 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ill. 1962).
9 Id. at 209.
10 298 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1974).
1I Id. at 365.
12 156 So. 2d 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
13 Id. at 660-61; see also Heddendorfv.Joyce, 178 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965) (Although generally within the trial court's discretion in Florida, a
trial court's refusal to grant a defendant's request to respond to a per diem argu-
ment, which was mentioned for the first time in closing argument by plaintiffs
attorney, does constitute reversible error.).
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B. HEDONIC DAMAGES (Loss OF ENJOYMENT OF LIFE)
What is the "value" of an individual's life? How can the lost
value of life be argued in closing? Hedonic damages, also re-
ferred to as damages for the loss of enjoyment of life, compen-
sate the plaintiff for the intangible value of loss of life. 4
Advocates of hedonic damages argue that court awards for lost
wages and pain and suffering fall short of making the plaintiff
whole. 15 Moreover, supporters of hedonic damages assert that
life is inherently worth more than just a person's earning poten-
tial. 6 In many courts, however, the value of a human being is
not recognized as hedonic advocates would hope. According to
the laws of many states, your life is worth no more than your
annual salary. 7 With the exception of Georgia, Connecticut,
Mississippi, and New Mexico, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases, 8 if a
person is injured or killed and has lost all of his or her future
enjoyment of life, but has no lost income, that individual, or his
or her survivors, stand little chance of collecting anything for
the value of that individual's life.' 9
At least one federal court has refused to recognize hedonic
damages.2z In a wrongful death case, the Florida District Court
stated: "The court is of the opinion that there is no cause of
action for hedonic damages in Florida. The court must follow
the guidelines established by [Florida statutes] and Florida case
14 Virginia Smith Gautier, Comment, Hedonic Damages: A Variation in Paths, the
Questionable Expert and a Recommendation for Clarity in Mississippi, 65 Miss. L.J. 735,
736 (1996). The word "hedonic" is derived from the Greek word "hedonikos"
referring to one of the ancient Greek schools of philosophy that extolled the
virtues of pursuing life's pleasures. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE EN-
GLISH LANGUAGE 837 (3d ed. 1992).
15 Gautier, supra note 14, at 736-37.
16 Id.
' See Stan V. Smith, Measuring the Loss of Enjoyment of Life in Personal Injury Cases
in Washington-Hedonic Damages, TRIAL NEWS, Jan. 1997, at 29.
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (stating "[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial of-
ficer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive
relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory
relief was unavailable.").
19 Smith, supra note 17, at 29.
20 Brown v. Seebach, 763 F. Supp. 574, 583 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
466
CLOSING ARGUMENT
law until such time as the Supreme Court or the Florida legisla-
ture decides differently."2'
In the aviation context, a Michigan District Court ruled that
under the Michigan Wrongful Death Act, hedonic damages
were not recoverable for a decedent.22 In that case, the dece-
dent was a pilot who was killed when the plane crashed into
trees. 2' Before the damages phase of the trial, the decedent's
survivors filed a motion for hedonic damages.24 The court ex-
plained that, in Michigan, hedonic damages are reserved solely
for a living and permanently injured person. 25 Here, the court
found that there was an insufficient amount of time between the
crash and the pilot's death to allow for an award of hedonic
damages. 26 The court noted that the decedent was, however,
entitled to damages for emotional distress as an element of pain
and suffering in the moments before his death. 27
States that recognize damages for the loss of enjoyment of life
differ on whether it should be argued as a separate element of
damages, or whether it should be considered a part of the dam-
ages for pain and suffering or permanent injury. Thus, it would
be wise to check the local rules to determine if hedonic damages
may be argued, and if so, whether they may be asserted as dam-
ages independent of pain and suffering.
Loss of enjoyment of life arguments invariably led to the de-
velopment and creation of the hedonics expert. The idea of
presenting expert testimony that could assign a mathematical
value to the loss of enjoyment of life in personal injury and
wrongful death cases began drawing attention in the mid to late
1980s. 2 8 A small group of forensic economists began to develop
ways to apply cost benefit analysis to tort damages using eco-
nomics, statistics, real growth rate, present value tables, and life
expectancy charts. Articles and books were written, and the so-
called "hedonics expert" was born.
Although the concept of hedonic damages itself has gained
acceptance in some jurisdictions, the notion that an "expert"
21 Id.
22 Brereton v. United States, 973 F. Supp. 752, 756 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
23 Id. at 754.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 756.
26 Id. at 757.
27 Id.
28 Jeff McKean, Expert Testimony on Hedonic Damages Lacks Court Acceptance, IND.
LAw., Jan. 22, 1997, at 23.
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witness can testify to the value which a jury should assign for
hedonic damages has been almost universally rejected.2" Inter-
estingly, some courts within the same jurisdiction have allowed
the testimony in one case, only to exclude it in the next.30 This
has led to uncertainty among attorneys as to how they can best
prove, or disprove, claims of hedonic damages in the
courtroom.
In Sherrod v. Berry, the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois determined that economist Stan V. Smith's
expert testimony on hedonic damages was not speculative and
upheld it as "enabl[ing] the jury to perform its function in de-
termining the proper measure of damages in the case."3 The
court ruled that hedonic value testimony was invaluable to the
jury and that it did not invade its province as the defense had
argued.12 By contrast, just six years later, in Mercado v. Ahmed,
the same court refused to allow Stan V. Smith to testify as an
expert on the measure of hedonic damages.3" The Mercado
court opined that before allowing any expert to testify, the "reli-
ability and validity" of any proffered expert testimony had to be
carefully considered on topics that had not been uniformly ac-
cepted in the scientific or legal community.34 Since there was
neither "basic agreement among economists as to what elements
ought to go into the life valuation," nor proof of reliability, the
court excluded the expert's testimony on the plaintiffs loss of
enjoyment of life. 5
The decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 6
directly affected the issue of admissibility of expert testimony in
hedonic damages cases. Ayers v. Robinson37 provides a compre-
hensive example of a case in which the Daubert factors were ap-
plied to determine the admissibility of expert testimony on loss
of enjoyment of life. In Ayers, the defendant made a motion to
29 Id.
30 Compare Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (allowing expert
testimony on hedonic damages) with Mercado v. Ahmed, 756 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D.
Il1. 1991) (excluding expert testimony on hedonic damages).
31 Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 164. In Sherrod, the hedonic award was for $850,000,
in addition to lost earnings of $300,000 and loss of society and companionship of
$450,000. Id. at 160.
32 See id. at 164.
33 Mercado, 756 F. Supp. at 1103.
34 Id. at 1101-02.
35 Id. at 1103.
36 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
37 887 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. 11. 1995).
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exclude the plaintiffs expert from testifying on hedonic dam-
ages on the grounds that Daubert precluded such testimony.3" In
determining whether the witness could testify, the court sub-
jected each factor that the expert typically relied upon in reach-
ing his final figure to a Daubert analysis. 9 After reviewing the
various methods employed by the expert, the Ayers court
soundly rejected the argument that the techniques used to eval-
uate the worth of a person's life were scientific." The court de-
termined that the seemingly endless possible variance in results
makes this type of expert testimony imprecise and speculative.4 '
Since Daubert, other federal decisions on the question of
whether hedonic damage "experts" can testify have become
more uniform in excluding expert witness testimony on hedonic
damages after applying the Daubert standard.42
Although federal courts appear to be excluding expert testi-
mony on hedonic damages in light of Daubert,43 it is uncertain
how state courts will rule when faced with this evidentiary di-
lemma. Presumably, if the language of a state's rule of evidence
is similar to Federal Rule 702,"4 the state court may apply a
Daubert analysis in reaching its own decision. If a state's eviden-
tiary rule is strikingly different from the federal rule, it may be
difficult to convince a state courtjudge to exclude such "expert"
testimony on the grounds that it is unreliable and lacks proba-
tive value.
3S Id. at 1051.
39 Id. at 1059-64.
40 Id. at 1064.
41 See id.
42 See, e.g., Sullivan v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 862 F. Supp. 317, 319 (D. Kan. 1994)
(applying Daubert principles to preclude testimony of plaintiff's expert witness);
Hein v. Merck & Co., 868 F. Supp. 230, 235 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (stating expert
testimony regarding hedonic damages was "unreliable and invalid" in light of
Daubert); Chustz v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 659 So. 2d 784, 785 (La. Ct. App.
1995) (excluding expert testimony as to value of life); Wilt v. Buracker, 443
S.E.2d 196, 200 (W. Va. 1993) (noting that since West Virginia's Rule 702 is iden-
tical to Federal Rule 702, a Daubert analysis was material in determining whether
hedonic expert could testify), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2137 (1994).
43 For pre-Daubert cases that barred expert testimony on hedonic damages, see
Fetzer v. Wood, 569 N.E.2d 1237, 1247 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (excluding expert
testimony on hedonic damages on grounds that hedonic damages "are not ame-
nable to ... analytical precision").
4 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EviD. 702.
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C. WALK A MILE IN PLAINTIFF'S SHOES
"How would you feel if you were in the same situation as Mr.
Passenger?" This type of argument, often referred to as the
"Golden Rule" argument, "suggests ... jurors ... put themselves
in the shoes of one of the parties."45 A majority of courts find
that such an argument is impermissible because it encourages
the jurors to decide the case on the basis of personal interest
and sympathy rather than on the evidence.46
Although some courts have held that the "Golden Rule" argu-
ment is not improper per se, an attempt to undermine the neu-
trality of ajury by asking its members "to place themselves in the
plaintiffs' position and urg[ing] them to award an amount of
money they would desire if they had been the victim[ ]" is cer-
tainly grounds for reversal.47 The key to an impermissible
"Golden Rule" argument is when the argument "strike[s] at
th [e] sensitive area of financial responsibility and hypothetically
request[s] the jury to consider how much they would wish to
receive in a similar situation."'4 8
In one aviation wrongful death case, a Florida court found
that the use of a "Golden Rule" argument in the plaintiff's clos-
ing statement constituted a "blatant, direct appeal for sympa-
thy."49 However, despite the plaintiffs improper remarks, the
court concluded that, although the jury award was substantial, it
was not excessive because there was credible evidence in the re-
cord to support the amount of personal injury damages.50
Likewise, in Smith v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc.,51 plaintiff s counsel
remarked during his summation to the jury that, in awarding
45 Simmonds v. Lowery, 563 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
46 Metro. Dade County v. Zapata, 601 So. 2d 239, 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992); Simmonds, 563 So. 2d at 184.
47 See Coral Gables Hosp., Inc. v. Zabala, 520 So. 2d 653, 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988).
48 Schaffer v. Ward, 510 So. 2d 602, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
49 Arnold v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 186, 196 (4th Cir. 1982).
50 Id. at 200-01. The compensatory damages awards were $3,027,500 for the
personal injuries of one of the plane's passengers and $1,137,500 for the other
passenger. Id. at 200. "The fault specifically admitted by [the airline] as the basis
for its liability was the failure of the pilots to be aware of the plane's altitude
immediately prior to the crash" which was corroborated by on-board and airport
recorders. Id. at 190 n.I. The trial judge characterized the pilot's inattention
and carelessness as "a shocking lack of attentiveness," "unattentiveness and care-
lessness of a truly extraordinary nature," and "not simply inadvertent but grossly
negligent." Id.
51 728 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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the proper amount of damages, "[y]ou have to try to feel what
[the plaintiff] must be going through. '52 The court found
plaintiffs comments to be a mere plea to the jury to consider
the amount of pain the plaintiff experienced.5 3 The court con-
cluded the plaintiff's attorney was encouraging the jury to award
appropriate damages, not attempting to arouse the sympathy of
the jury.54 The court noted that, to the extent that these com-
ments were improper, they "were cured by the [trial] court's
charge to the jury ... to weigh and consider the evidence with-
out regard to sympathy, prejudice, or passion, for or against any
party. '55
Thus, there is a fine line counsel must walk when asking the
jury to consider his or her client's position. Counsel may ask the
jury to use their common sense to evaluate the positions of the
parties but cannot ask the jury to consider what they feel that
they would be entitled to if they were in the shoes of either
party.
D. IMPASSIONED STATEMENTS ABOUT THE CASE
Attorneys often employ the tactic of using strong and zealous
language during closing arguments to leave a lasting impression
on the jury. Depending on the scope and inflammatory nature
of the language used, this tactic could backfire if an appeal is
later raised requesting a new trial. In addition, the codes of pro-
fessional ethics in a majority of states prohibit attorneys from
injecting unnecessary personal comments into the litigation.
For example, Rule 4-3.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for
the Florida Bar states that it is improper for trial counsel to
allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe
is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence,
assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying
as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a
cause, the culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence
of an accused.56
The Florida District Court of Appeal specifically cited this rule
in Bellsouth Human Resources Administration, Inc. v. Colatarci57
when determining the propriety of remarks made by attorneys




56 R. REGULATINc FLA. BAR 4-3.4(e).
57 641 So. 2d 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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on both sides during closing arguments. 58 In that case, the de-
fense counsel made an aggressive attack on the plaintiffs law-
yers in his closing argument, suggesting that the "bringing of
frivolous lawsuits was one of the major ills of our society. '59 Dur-
ing plaintiffs rebuttal argument, he directly addressed the re-
marks made by the defense counsel: "I understand [defense
counsel] said it himself, corporate America. You know, the folks
that brought you the gas tank that explodes, and agent orange,
and silicone breast implants."6 In ruling on these comments,
the court of appeal severely reprimanded both attorneys, held
them in direct violation of rule 4-3.4(e), and mandated a new
trial.61
Additionally, courts usually do not tolerate comments that at-
tack the resources of a corporate defendant. In Wellner v. New
York Life Insurance Co.,6 2 the Illinois Appellate Court stated that
"[t]hough it may be common knowledge that the defendant is a
company of vast resources, it does not justify emphasis of that
fact in an argument to the jury, which can only have a tendency
to prejudice the jury against th[e] defendant."63
58 Id. at 429.
59 Id. The defense counsel's remarks included:
It is, indeed, I think, alarming that trial lawyers will . . .hope to
be able to get [the] six members of thejury to give them $1,500,000
for a broken leg. It seems to say I think a lot about the deteriora-
tion of our society.
[I]t says a great deal about the deterioration of our system, a
broken leg a million dollars. A broken leg a million and a half
dollars. What is it about our system that has created a situation that
every time we do something if it doesn't turn out the way we
thought we sue?
Id.
60 Id. at 428.
61 Id. at 429-31. It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeal also rebuked
the trial court for not sustaining the objections of counsel in this case:
It is exasperating that, no matter how many times appellate
courts cite this well-known rule [rule 4-3.4(e)], trial counsel and
trial judges do not- seem to get the message....
It is the trial court's responsibility, when objections are made to
improper argument, to sustain the objections and let counsel know
that these tactics will not be tolerated.
Id. at 430.
62 73 N.E.2d 156 (Il1. App. Ct. 1947).
63 Id. at 159. In this case, plaintiff's counsel had remarked:
Now, fortunately, at this particular stage of the game, why, the New
York Life Insurance Company, or any other large corporation
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It seems that as long as the statements are not highly prejudi-
cial or of an overly aggressive nature, most courts are willing to
grant attorneys wide leeway in their closing arguments. As one
court aptly stated:
In a case ... involving a horrible human tragedy and almost
immeasurable loss, it must be expected that counsel during clos-
ing summation to the jury will engage in sometimes emotional
and heated debate. Counsel are accorded a wide latitude in mak-
ing arguments to the jury, and unless their remarks are highly
prejudicial and inflammatory, counsel's statements made to the
jury during closing arguments will not serve as a basis for revers-
ing a judgment.64
Likewise, the court in Anderson Aviation Sales Co. v. Perez,6 5 simi-
larly stated: "The granting of a new trial because of the miscon-
duct of counsel in closing argument is only sparingly granted. It
should never be granted for a disciplinary measure, but only to
prevent a miscarriage of justice."66
The court's opinion in Cohen v. Lowe Aviation Co. 67 demon-
strates the reluctance of most courts to overturn a case based on
an attorney's remarks during closing argument. In that case,
the plaintiff complained that the defense counsel used grossly
improper regionalisms to align himself with the jury.68 Specifi-
cally, during closing argument, the defense counsel "exhorted
the jury not to send [plaintiff's] counsel back to New York with a
croker sack full of money. '69 The court found that such a trial
stands on an even keel or stands even Stephen with an individual,
as [the plaintiff] and at this particular time, why, they don't have
the advantage of their vast resources to secure photostatic copies.
Id.
64 Metro. Dade County v. Dillon, 305 So. 2d 36, 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974);
see also Broge v. State, 288 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Lovell v.
Henry, 212 So. 2d 67, 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Wise v.Jacksonville Gas Corp.,
97 So. 2d 704, 707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
65 508 P.2d 87 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973). In that case, the plaintiff's attorney re-
ferred to the aircraft company in his closing argument as "the target defendant"
and "the prime defendant." Id. at 94. He also explained that the company
"would have been kicked out of court long ago if the case was without merit." Id.
At this point in the argument, the court interrupted the attorney before any ob-
jection was raised and very pointedly admonished the jury as follows: "I will ad-
monish the jury to disregard the last remarks of counsel as to whether there has
been a prior ruling on whether you have or do not have a case to present to the
jury." Id.
66 Id. at 94.
67 470 S.E.2d 813 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
68 Id. at 815.
69 Id.
2008] 473
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
strategy was at a minimum "impolite and arguably unprofes-
sional" but not so inflammatory as to have "blinded the jury to
the eight days of evidence which was otherwise competently
presented. 70
In an aviation wrongful death case, the defendant alleged that
the district court should have sustained its objections to certain
statements made by the plaintiffs counsel in closing argu-
ment.7 ' The comments about which the defense complained in-
cluded the following:
The nature of this lawsuit is what I would call a consumer protec-
tion type case; [The deceased] was killed because of their respon-
sibility; We're here because of the responsibility of McDonnell
Douglas in the manufacture of this aircraft; and She [the wife of
deceased airline pilot] had Walter Lux, and they took him
away.
7 2
The court did not directly rule on the propriety of these state-
ments, but did mention that "improper comments during clos-
ing argument rarely rise to the level of reversible error. 73
Emotional and zealous statements may keep the jury's atten-
tion and demonstrate a passionate belief in your client's posi-
tion which may sometimes convince a jury to return a verdict in
your favor. However, these comments may also convince an ap-
pellate court to order a new trial.
E. EVIDENCE
1. Photographs
Gruesome photos are ripe for motions in limine by the de-
fense. Mostjurisdictions seem to allow photographs of the dece-
dent so long as there is some relevance to the claim or defense.
For example, photos of the burned decedent on the autopsy ta-
ble may be admitted if evidence supports the plaintiff's claim
that the decedent survived the impact. The defense, of course,
may stipulate that the decedent was burned and died as a result
of the accident, and move to exclude the photos, arguing that
70 Id. at 815-16.
71 In re Air Crash Disaster near Chi., Ill., on May 25, 1979, 803 F.2d 304, 317
(7th Cir. 1986). In this case, the widow of an airline pilot, killed in an airplane
crash en route to Los Angeles, brought a suit against an aircraft manufacturer for
compensatory damages. Id. at 306-07.
72 Id. at 317.
73 Id. The court decided that since there was going to be a new trial on dam-
ages, it would leave it to the district court on remand to "guard against any
[other] improper statements." Id.
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the extent of the burning does not prove consciousness nor is it
representative of the suffering sustained by the decedent. As-
suming the photos are admitted, reference to them in closing
argument should be guarded. More often than not, the photos
had their desired effect on the jury during the case in chief, and
their effect will not be lost upon the jury by the time of closing
arguments. Further reference to the photos by either party dur-
ing closing could run the risk of sensationalizing the case or of-
fending the jury. This is particularly true if the testifying
medical examiner conceded, for example, that the burns in the
photo do not prove consciousness, or exceed the threshold that
any human could have endured. Thus, the use of gruesome
photos during closing argument should be limited to those in-
stances where the photo truly proves a claim or defense.
2. Exhibits
At the appropriate places during closing argument, counsel
should use those exhibits admitted into evidence which corrobo-
rate and highlight the main points of the closing argument.
Holding up evidence and displaying it for ajury keeps their at-
tention while concentrating and solidifying counsel's case. This
concept works well for the plaintiff when using photos, films,
and other sympathetic evidence related to the decedent's family
to support a damages argument. Generally, it is more difficult
for the defense to use tangible evidence in a closing argument
related to damages. References to income history summary
charts and the opposing party's economists' reports, particularly
if the methodology is suspect, should strongly be considered.
The more difficult question becomes whether a litigant may
use demonstrative evidence during closing argument that was
not introduced as evidence during the trial. In Louisiana,
charts, models, sketches, and even a cartoon have been permit-
ted during closing argument, even when not in evidence. In
Schwamb v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the plaintiff was struck by a suit-
case which fell out of an overhead bin."4 "In closing argument,
plaintiffs' counsel showed the jury a magazine advertisement or
cartoon, which had not been admitted in evidence, as an exam-
ple of how easily Delta could have warned its passengers of the
danger presented by overstuffed or improperly loaded overhead
74 516 So. 2d 452, 456 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
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luggage bins. '7 5 The Louisiana Court of Appeal held that "[i]t
is within the discretion of the trial court to permit counsel to
illustrate his or her remarks to the jury with reasonable demon-
strative aids, such as blackboards, charts, models, sketches and
the like, as long as such aids are relevant, and are not unduly
inflammatory, misleading or prejudicial. 76
Although the use of props not admitted into evidence during
closing argument creates a risk of diverting the jury's attention
to facts not properly before it, there is no rule barring counsel's
use of "rhetorical devices, be they linguistic or in the form of
visual aids. ' 77 "[A]s long as there is no reasonable likelihood
that the ... device [used by counsel] will confuse the jury or...
prejudice the opposing party," attorneys are given considerable
leeway with the use of props in closing argument. 7- However,
counsel is still cautioned to familiarize themselves with the spe-
cific law in their jurisdiction, as well as the preferences of local
judges regarding the use of demonstrative evidence during clos-
ing argument.
3. Experts
Arguing damages in an aviation wrongful death case would
not be complete without its share of expert witnesses. It is likely
that in cases involving numerous expert witnesses, comments
discrediting the other side's experts will be made in closing ar-
guments. Courts typically do not find these kinds of comments
to be so prejudicial or inflammatory as to warrant a new trial.79
For example, in one aviation case, the plaintiffs counsel "as-
sailed the credibility of the defense expert .. .when he dis-
cussed the amount paid to [the defense expert doctor] for his
services."80 The court stated that "[w]hile his remarks may have
75 Id. at 463. The advertisement, from Newsweek magazine, contained a cartoon
depiction of "a suitcase falling from an overhead airplane luggage compartment
onto a ... businesswoman, and was captioned: My Financial Partner? New En-
gland Life, of course. Why?" Id. at 464 n.9.
76 Id. at 464.
77 State v. Ancona, 854 A.2d 718, 737 (Conn. 2004).
78 Id. at 737-38. See, e.g., Laney v. State, 515 S.E.2d 610 (Ga. 1999) (allowing
prosecutor to use bag of sugar not introduced into evidence to demonstrate
amount of force necessary to pull trigger of murder weapon); People v. Dowds,
625 N.E.2d 878 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (allowing prosecutor in a drunk driving case
to use beer mug and large pitcher, not admitted into evidence, to demonstrate
amount of beer that defendant allegedly had consumed).




been 'inelegant, tasteless, [and] offensive,' they did not go so far
as to imply that [the defense expert doctor] would have testified
to anything for the right price."' The court went so far as to
say, "the rule confining counsel to legitimate argument is not
based on etiquette, but on justice. 8 2
In O'Donnell v. Holy Family Hospital,8" plaintiff's counsel did go
so far as to imply that the defense's expert would have testified
to anything for the right price. In this case, the court found that
the plaintiffs comments regarding the defense's expert doctor
as a "hired gun" and arguing that the doctor would "say
whatever it takes for the paycheck he picks up" were improper
and unprofessional.8 4 However, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs argument was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a
new trial.85 Other courts have similarly found that comments
insinuating that experts were "the best experts that money can
buy" and had "a significant financial interest" in the case were
not so improper as to warrant a new trial.86 Thus, discrediting
the opposing party's expert witness, while improper and unpro-
fessional according to the trial courts, rarely warrants mandating
a new trial on appeal.
4. Witnesses
In making closing arguments, most attorneys want to discredit
the opposing side's witnesses and will highlight to the jury any
flaws from the witnesses' testimony or character in general. This
may be a prevalent issue in cases where an attorney refers to the
opposing side's witness as a "liar." Whether the attorney crosses
the line when labeling the witness a "liar" is more "a question of
degree as opposed to a bright-line rule. The frequency with
which the infractions are repeated during closing argument may
be determinative of any error in closing argument."8 7 Gener-
ally, however, calling a witness a "liar" is not improper when sup-
81 Id. (quoting Arnold v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 186, 195 (4th Cir. 1982)).
82 Id. (quoting Gutin v. Frank Mascali & Sons, 198 N.Y.S.2d 492, 502 (Sup. Ct.
1960)).
83 682 N.E.2d 386 (II. App. Ct. 1997).
84 Id. at 397.
85 Id.
86 Jacobs v. Union Pac. R.R., 683 N.E.2d 176, 178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); see also
Ellington v. Bilsel, 626 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding references to
expert as "polished" and "a performer" were not as inflammatory as the "hired
gun" line of cases); Moore v. Centreville Twp. Hosp., 616 N.E.2d 1321, 1332 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993) (finding "hired gun" type of comment was not improper).
87 Montz, supra note 3, at 120.
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ported by record evidence.88 As the Florida Supreme Court
noted,
it is not proper for counsel to state during closing argument that
a witness 'lied' or is a 'liar'. . . [but] [i]f the evidence supports
such a characterization, counsel is not impermissibly stating a
personal opinion about the credibility of a witness, but is instead
submitting to the jury a conclusion that reasonably may be drawn
from the evidence.89
Some courts, however, have established more of a bright line
rule against characterizing witnesses as "liars" in closing argu-
ment. In Olenin v. Curtin &Johnson, Inc.,9 ° the court emphati-
cally stated, "[i]t is unprofessional conduct, meriting discipline
by the court, for counsel either to vouch for his own witness or
to categorize opposing witnesses as 'liars'; that issue is for the
jury."91 State and federal courts appear to remain sharply di-
vided on whether counsel may refer to a witness as a "liar" in
closing argument.
Another area for potential improper argument lies where a
party may comment on the other party's failure to call a witness
88 See Mason v. Mitchell, 95 F. Supp. 2d 744, 781 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (finding
use of the word "preposterous" not inflammatory) which provides the following
examples: United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 1999) ("not im-
proper for prosecutor to assert that defendant is lying"); Kellogg v. Skon, 176
F.3d 447, 451-52 (8th Cir. 1999) ("improper for prosecutor to call defendant
'monster,' 'sexual deviant,' and 'liar,' but no prejudice shown where weight of
evidence against defendant was heavy"); United States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889, 893
(8th Cir. 1998) ("not improper for prosecutor to call defendant a 'con man' and
'liar"'); Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 744-45 (9th Cir. 1998) ("not improper
for prosecutor to call defendant 'stupid' and to refer to defense counsel's argu-
ment as 'trash"'); United States v. Collins, 78 F.3d 1021, 1039-40 (6th Cir. 1996)
("improper for prosecutor to state that defense counsel deserved an Academy
Award for keeping a straight face when he made his arguments, but no prejudice
shown where weight of evidence against defendant was heavy"); United States v.
Reliford, 58 F.3d 247, 250 (6th Cir. 1995) ("not improper for prosecutor to char-
acterize defendant's testimony as 'unbelievable,' 'ridiculous,' and 'a fairy tale"');
United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 1393, 1402-03 (7th Cir. 1994) ("not improper for
prosecutor to refer to defendant's case as 'trash,' 'hogwash,' and 'garbage"'). See
also United States v. Catalfo, 64 F.3d 1070, 1080 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a
prosecutor's description of the defendant as a liar was not improper); H. Patrick
Furman, Avoiding Error in Closing Argument, 24 COLO. LAw. 33, 33-34 (1995) (A
"statement that a witness 'lied' during his or her testimony has been held inap-
propriate, as has a statement that a witness was 'honest."').
89 Murphy v. Int'l Robotic Sys., Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010, 1028 (Fla. 2000).
90 424 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
91 Id. at 769.
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if the witness was peculiarly available to the other side.92 In one
aviation case, the defense contended that the "plaintiffs re-
peated statements regarding defendant's failure to call certain
witnesses ... implied that defendant had not been completely
candid in its presentation of the case."93 The court stated that
"during summation, counsel may comment on a party's failure
to call a witness under its control whose testimony was expected
to have been favorable. 94
Yet, not all courts agree with that court's conclusion.95 The
Minnesota Supreme Court has observed that "such comment
might suggest to the jury that defendant has some duty to pro-
duce witnesses or that he bears some burden of proof."96
In order to comment on a missing witness, generally two require-
ments must be met. First, it must be shown that the party failing
to call the witness has it peculiarly within its power to produce
the witness. Second, the witness's testimony must "elucidate" is-
sues important to the trial, as opposed to being irrelevant or
cumulative.97
Counsel may also make reference to records that opposing
counsel failed to produce at trial. When a party fails to produce
relevant documents or other evidence, and it is shown that the
party has some special ability to produce such evidence, oppos-
ing counsel is free to point that failure out to the jury.9" It is
reversible error to suggest concealment of records, but it is per-
missible to note the records are missing."
During closing argument, a lawyer is permitted to make "fair
comment" about the evidence and the law, which includes rea-
sonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. This
includes characterization of the other side's witnesses as "liars"
92 See United States v. Carroll, 871 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Myre v.
Kroger Co., 530 N.E.2d 1122, 1124-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (stating that the fail-
ure of an opponent to put on a key witness, not equally available to both parties,
raises a negative inference and may be commented on by counsel in closing
argument).
93 Smith v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 914, 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
94 Id.
95 See, e.g., Ross v. State, 803 P.2d 1104, 1105-06 (Nev. 1990) (stating that the
missing witness argument may be an improper shifting of the burden of proof to
the defense because, in essence, it tells "the jury that it was the defendant's bur-
den to produce proof by explaining the absence of witnesses or evidence").
96 State v. Caron, 218 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Minn. 1974).
97 Montz, supra note 3, at 121.
98 United States v. Pitts, 918 F.2d 197, 199-200 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
99 Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 20-22, Gammonley v. Patel, 797 N.E.2d 242
(I11. App. Ct. 2001) (No. i-99-3925).
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when supported by the evidence, as well as "negative inferences"
that may arise from one party's failure to produce witnesses or
records within their control.
5. Special Interrogatories
A topic that typically gets little attention is the discussion, dur-
ing closing argument, of special verdict forms or special inter-
rogatories. Generally, it is not misconduct for an attorney to
read and discuss, in his closing argument, interrogatories which
the court had indicated an intention to submit to the jury, and
to "point[ ] out what answers ought to be returned thereto."'1°
On the other hand, most jurisdictions state that a jury should
not be informed of the legal effect of its answers to special inter-
rogatories.' The general rule prohibits attorneys from inform-
ing the jury of the effect of their findings. 2 This rule is
designed to prevent an appeal to jurors to abandon their duty to
answer the questions according to the evidence, and to answer
them so that a particular desired result will be achieved. For
example, plaintiffs counsel cannot state in closing argument
that the reason defendants wanted the jury to answer the first
question "no," was because they knew that such a response
would end the case. 10 3
It is also improper for an attorney to tell the jury that it needs
to be consistent when it answers a special interrogatory.' 4 That
is, that its special verdict must be consistent with the general
verdict.'0 5 However, it is proper for counsel to urge the jury,
based on the evidence, to answer the interrogatory in favor of
their client.'06
F. EXPERIMENTS, STORIES, AND ANALOGIES
Although, in a majority of jurisdictions, lower courts have dis-
cretion regarding the extent to which counsel may illustrate his
or her remarks to the jury, some appellate courts have limited
that discretion. In one such case, the appellant alleged that the
trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial in light of defense
100 Clear Creek Stone Co. v. Carmichael, 73 N.E. 935, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 1905).
101 Sommese v. Maling Bros., Inc., 222 N.E.2d 468, 470 (Ill. 1966).
102 Galveston, H. & H.R. Co. v. Fleming, 203 S.W. 105, 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston 1918, writ dism'd).
103 Id.





counsel's closing remarks regarding injuries allegedly suffered
when his client's cologne ignited."0 7 During closing argument,
defense counsel poured a substance, purportedly the same co-
logne that the plaintiff was wearing at the time of his injury,
onto his arm, lit a match and passed it over the doused arm while
stating: . . . "Let's see how he did it. God, if I am wrong, burn
me .... I urge you to believe the evidence of your eyes. If you
have any doubt about it, try it for yourselves. Upon normal appli-
cation, the product is not flammable."10 8
The appellate court stated that the defense counsel's experi-
ment "was reasonably calculated to cause the rendition of an
improper judgment."'0 9 The appellate court reversed and re-
manded, recognizing that even an instruction from the court
would not have eliminated from the juror's minds the combined
visual and oral effect of defense counsel's experiment."10
Numerous articles and journals on closing arguments en-
courage attorneys to use stories or analogies in their closing re-
marks."' However, it is important to be cautious when telling a
story or using an analogy because the mental image perceived
by ajudge or jury may be different than the one intended by the
attorney.1 2 For example:
A criminal defense lawyer is making his closing argument to the
jury. His client is accused of murder, but the body of the victim
has never been found. He dramatically withdraws his pocket
watch and announces to the jury, "Ladies and gentlemen, I have
some astounding news. We have found the supposed victim of
this murder alive and well, and, in exactly one minute, he will
walk through that door into this courtroom." A hushed silence
falls over the courtroom, as everyone waits for the momentous
entry. Nothing happens. The lawyer then says, "The mere fact
that you were watching that door, expecting the victim to walk
into this courtroom, suggests that you have a reasonable doubt
whether a murder was committed." Pleased with the impact of
the stunt, he then sits down to await an acquittal. The jury is
instructed, files out and files back in 10 minutes later with a ver-
dict finding the defendant guilty. Following the proceedings, the
107 Howard v. Faberge, Inc., 679 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
108 Id. at 649.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 650.
1I SeeJames H. Seckinger, Closing Argument, 19 AM.J. TRIAL ADvoc. 51, 61-69
(1995).
112 Id. at 68.
2008]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
astounded lawyer chases after the jury foreman to find out what
went wrong. "How could you convict?" he asks. "You were all
watching the door!" The foreman explains, "Most of us were
watching the door. But one of us was watching the defendant,
and he wasn't watching the door."'13
Therefore, experiments and stories during closing must be
used cautiously as they may result in reversal, conviction, or lia-
bility determination, instead of an inventive and clever victory.
G. INSURANCE
Generally, references to a defendant's insurance coverage
have long been excluded in civil proceedings. The reason for
this exclusion is to preventjurors from attaching "liability where
none exists, or to arrive at an excessive amount through sympa-
thy for the injured party and the thought that the burden would
not have to be met by the defendant.""' 4 Statements during
closing arguments that suggest the absence of insurance are
seen as an effort to invoke sympathetic feelings, and a myriad of
courts have found that an attorney's statements that his client
must personally pay a judgment are improper. 1 5 For instance,
in Koonce v. Pacilio,"1 6 defense counsel had stated that "every-
thing [the defendants have] gotten is threatened because of a
possible verdict [which could be] a potential 'tragedy to the [de-
fendants] depending on how this case goes."'117 The court con-
cluded that counsel's suggestion that defendants had no
insurance and would be personally responsible for judgment
was prejudicial."18
Yet courts are less likely to find that the reference to insur-
ance warrants a reversal when the reference is rare, isolated, and
unique." 9 This principle was applied in Melara v. Cicione, where
113 Montz, supra note 3, at 88-89.
14 Carls Mkts., Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789, 793 (Fla. 1953).
115 Montz, supra note 3, at 127.
116 718 N.E.2d 628 (Il. App. Ct. 1999).
17 Id. at 634.
118 Id. at 635.
1P SeeJohnson v. Canteen Corp., 528 So. 2d 1364, 1365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (no reversal for new trial for two references alluding to workers' compen-
sation insurance where there was no disclosure to jury that plaintiff had been
compensated for her injury); see also S. Motor Co. v. Accountable Constr. Co., 707
So. 2d 909, 911 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (reversed for new trial where, over the
defendant's standing objection, the plaintiff was permitted to introduce pervasive
and extensive evidence of the existence and amount of the defendant's insurance
coverage in a breach of contract action); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Dewberry, 383
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the appellants appealed "an unsolicited reference to an insur-
ance adjuster made by one of the appellee's treating physi-
cians."' 20 The court found that such an insular reference to an
insurance adjuster was harmless error.121 In addition, because
the issue before the jury turned on contested injury damages,
the court rationalized that the outcome of the case turned on a
battle of the experts and not on the passing reference of the
existence of insurance. 122
One exception to this rule that seems to go against its pur-
pose is that, while the mention of insurance may be prejudicial
toward a defendant, a defendant can voluntarily offer this infor-
mation to the jury. For example, it is permissible for the de-
fense to take the risk of injecting the existence of insurance
during its closing argument. This occurred in Bray v. Bi-State
Development Corp.,'23 where the defense counsel stated during
closing argument, "[y]es, we have insurance. Yes, we stand re-
sponsible to pay those people who we injure through our fault.
But we're not here to pay for every bad thing that happens to
every person who comes into the Arch garage." 124 The court
determined that such an argument was proper because it was
the defense counsel, and not plaintiff's attorney, who deliber-
ately inserted the comment.1 25
Ultimately, even if courts could uniformly quantify the differ-
ence between rare and repeated references to insurance cover-
age during closing argument, there still remains a dispute as to
whether a proper instruction could cure any prejudice created
by such a reference. 126 Consequently, due to the lack of clearly
So. 2d 1109, 1109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (repeated references by the insured's
counsel as to the amount of the policy limits during voir dire, opening argument,
and closing argument constituted reversible error); Levin v. Hanks, 356 So. 2d
21, 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (repeated argument to jury that insurance com-
pany was in effect trying to recover for second time was improper and required
reversal); Knowles v. Silasavage, 266 So. 2d 67, 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(plaintiff counsel's voir dire on the subject of insurance did not constitute
prejudice for reversible error).
120 712 So. 2d 429, 431 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 949 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
124 Id. at 101-02.
125 Id.
126 See, e.g., Falkowski v. Johnson, 148 F.R.D. 132, 137 (D. Del. 1993) (holding
that trial court's curative instructions did not remove any possible prejudice in
automobile accident damages case arising from implied reference by trial coun-
sel to insurance throughout closing argument).
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defined judicially determined violations, "continuous improper
argument and subsequent reversals regarding the mention of in-
surance are not merely probable: they are certain." '27
III. HOW (OR WHETHER) TO ADDRESS DAMAGES
Whether to argue damages is not a difficult question for the
plaintiffs attorney since damages are typically an element of the
plaintiffs aviation wrongful death case. How much to ask the
jury to return is a more difficult question that depends on the
facts of the particular case, including how witnesses came across
on the witness stand, whether damages documents support the
request, the venue, and the demographic makeup of the jury.
Asking the jury to award a disproportionately high number runs
the risk of sounding offensively greedy, while asking for a num-
ber that is too low may portray a lack of confidence in the plain-
tiffs case.
With respect to defense attorneys, debate continues to circu-
late about whether to address damages during closing argu-
ment. Some defense attorneys fear that any discussion of
damages implicitly carries with it an admission of liability. Many
defense lawyers, however, recognize that in most cases there is at
least some risk that the jury will return a verdict for the plaintiff
on liability and that, for this reason, it would be imprudent to
ignore damages.
Whether to argue damages from the defense side depends on
many of the same factors listed above for plaintiff, and also on
whether there are multiple defendants and whether your client
is, or is perceived as, the target defendant. It necessarily also
involves consistency in damages treatment in a contested liabil-
ity case. For example, if you contested damages during trial by
calling your own damages expert, then you would probably want
to argue damages in closing. If you presented an alternative
damages calculation to the plaintiffs economist, you would
probably want to argue it in closing.
All else being equal, it seems as though some discussion of
damages in a contested liability case should be considered, if for
no other reason than to offer the jury a different damages num-
ber than that offered by the plaintiffs attorney. After all, if the
jury does not accept your liability defense, then a jury has no
number against which to compare the numbers placed on the
127 Montz, supra note 3, at 129.
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board by the plaintiff. For example, in Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil,
Co.,1 28 the defense chose not to argue damages in closing argu-
ment. 1 29 The plaintiffs attorney, on the other hand, devoted
persuasive argument for an award of significant damages and
received an $11.1 billion verdict. 3 ' Thus, if the defense chooses
not to address damages at trial, one very compelling risk is that
the jury will be left with no direction concerning damages other
than the arguments presented by the plaintiffs attorney.131
Again, however, the strength of the liability case and the myr-
iad of factors listed above may warrant no discussion of damages
at all in the defense's case. Perhaps a good compromise is to
address the damages similar to the manner in which the attor-
ney rebuts the other elements of the plaintiffs case. This ap-
proach has at least two side effects. The argument ends on a
defensive point, and the argument also concludes on, perhaps, a
perceived assumption that the defendant is liable. To avoid
these pitfalls, defense counsel should organize the closing argu-
ment so as to end with a topic other than damages, discussing
damages at some point in the middle of the closing argument. 32
During closing, counsel should also consider explaining the
verdict form to the jurors as they are often confused about their
task once they enter the deliberation room. 131 One way to keep
jurors on track regarding damages is to present the verdict form
during closing and step jurors through it, question by question.
Using the real verdict form, either via an enlarged poster or by
projecting it onto a screen, can also be an effective way to ex-
plain the form from your point of view.
Though it is a good idea to work your defense strategy on
damages into your theme of the case, to a certain extent, the
decision to address damages may not be resolved until your clos-
ing argument. For example, what if the defense attorney makes
a weak final argument, including a weak effort on the damages
issues? Should plaintiffs counsel seek an amount higher in re-
128 Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 784 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1987, writ refd n.r.e.).
129 See Decision Quest, The Ghost of Pennzoil-Texas: Hidden Risks of Arguing
Alternative Damages, http://w,.decisionquest.com/litigationlibrary.php?
NewsID=219 (last visited June 29, 2008).
130 Texaco, 729 S.W.2d at 784.
131 Kerry E. Notestine, Closing Arguments, 29 BRIEF 72, 75 (1999).
132 Linda L. Listrom, American Bar Association Section of Litigation Annual
Conference: Lasting Impressions: The Role of Closing Argument (Apr. 20-23,
2005).
133 Notestine, supra note 131, at 73.
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buttal than he had originally intended? What if the plaintiff
puts on a compelling damages case, but the plaintiff's final argu-
ment is not as strong as it could have been, and your gut (or
your expensive jury consultant) tells you that there was not a lot
of emotion from the jury? If your plan was to argue damages,
do you now abandon it?' 4
There is no right or wrong answer to the above questions.
They are presented, however, to show that an attorney should
remain flexible. Though it is a good idea to stick to your trial
plan, there are simply times when that plan needs to be altered.
Despite the modern discovery rules designed to prevent it, trials
typically involve surprises. An attorney, plaintiff or defense,
should assure that he remains flexible to consider changes to
the final argument based on fluid changes in the trial, all the
while staying consistent with his theory of the case.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, there is no hard and fast rule that works for a
closing argument in every case. The considerations of what can
be said regarding damages during closing argument in an avia-
tion wrongful death case, and whether to address damages at all,
is something that can only be decided by the trial lawyer, guided
by the logic of cases similar to those discussed herein. Regard-
less of which side one is advocating, the closing argument
should tie the entire trial together in a coherent, persuasive, and
credible manner. Closing argument is the last opportunity to
present to the jury one's perspective on the recommended dam-
ages award. It would be unfortunate for the attorney to win the
battle at trial, only to lose the war on appeal because of an im-
proper or erroneous comment made during closing argument.
134 One option is to consider foregoing any argument on damages and present
a motion in limine after your argument to prevent plaintiffs counsel from ad-
dressing damages in his rebuttal argument.
